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Since the passage of the 1996 Farm Act, the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) 
has provided over $10 billion in technology adoption subsidies.  One of the national conservation 
priorities in EQIP is water conservation, but it is not known how participation in EQIP by 
irrigators affects water application rates and decisions to expand or reduce a farm’s irrigated 
acreage.  Using a farm-level panel data set drawn from three national samples of irrigators taken 
in 1998, 2003, and 2008, this study provides the first national scale econometric estimates of the 
changes in water application rates and irrigated acreage that result when a farm receives EQIP 
payments.  Due to a five-fold increase in EQIP funding following the 2002 farm bill, the change 
in EQIP participation between 2008 and earlier years is largely the result of an exogenous policy 
shock.  A difference-in-differences estimator that exploits this change in EQIP funding and also 
controls for unobserved farm-specific variables, suggests that for the average farm participating 
in EQIP between 2004 and 2008, the EQIP payments may have reduced water application rates 
but also may have increased total water use and led to an expansion in irrigated acreage.  
However, since EQIP participation is voluntary, there may still be a need to correct for bias due 
to sample selection.  A nearest neighbor matching estimator finds no evidence of any statistically 
significant effect of EQIP participation on technology adoption rates, water use, water 
application rates or acreages, which suggests that there is a high degree of self-selection into the 




U.S. farms now irrigate more cropland and pasture than ever before.
1  Irrigators collectively use 
more water than at any point since 1979.
2  However, as shown in table 1, the average water 
application rate (acre-feet per acre) has dropped about 10% over the past three decades.  These 
dual trends – increases in water use and decreases in water application rate – raise questions 
about whether ongoing efforts to conserve water using aggressive technology subsidies are 
effective. 
 
Since the passage of the 1996 Farm Bill, the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) 
has provided about 10% of the total program, over $1 billion in subsidies, for the adoption of 
water-conservation-related practices.  Most of these subsidies have gone toward technologies 
that could reduce water application rates (low-pressure sprinklers or drip irrigation systems) or 
improvements that reduce water losses (pipes, land leveling, and ditch lining).  The challenge in 
evaluating EQIP is that is we do not directly observe what farmers who receive EQIP payments 
would have done without getting the payments. 
 
In this study, we econometrically estimate the impact of EQIP on the average irrigator (or the 
average irrigated acre) for a variety of outcome variables – water use, application rates, share of 
operated acreage irrigated, and share of irrigated acreage in conserving technologies – by 
exploiting the large increase in EQIP funding that occurred following the 2002 Farm Act.  We 
construct a panel data set by linking farm-level observations across multiple years of the Farm 
                                                           
1 USDA Agricultural Census: 2007, table 1;  1978, chart 1. 
2 USDA Agricultural Census, FRIS: 2008, table 11; 1998, table 10; 1994, table 10; 1983, table 10. 2 
 
and Ranch Irrigation Survey (FRIS).  The panel structure of the data set allows us to control for 
omitted variables that influence a farm’s average level of the dependent variables and for 
regional shocks that influence changes in application rates.  We compare two methods – 





Numerous economic studies using programming models have asked whether the adoption of 
lower-flow (higher-efficiency) irrigation technology will actually save water.  The need for 
complicated programming models arises because on-farm water use depends on numerous 
factors and operator decisions that may be co-determined with irrigation technology choice.  
Adding voluntary participation in conservation programs to the analysis makes the problem more 
difficult. The literature on irrigation indicates several reasons that technology adoptions, and 
therefore technology subsidies, may not be an effective means to conserve water 
 
The first concern over the effectiveness of voluntary cost-share programs such as EQIP is that 
the farms most likely to adopt practices in the absence of the program may also be the most 
likely to apply for the program.  In the most extreme cases, cost-share programs may not induce 
any additional adoption of practices beyond what would happened in absence of the program. 
Unlike many of the wildlife conservation practices covered by EQIP, the irrigation practices 
have well documented private benefits.  Farmers adopt water-saving practices and upgrade 
equipment even when no public incentive is offered, for example, in response to drought (Schuck 
et al., 2005; Quiggin et al., 2010) or high costs for water (Negri and Brooks, 1990; Moreno and 
Sunding, 2005). In some cases, differences in soil characteristics, climate, and cropping patterns 
may be the most important factors determining adoption (Green et al., 1996). 
 
Even if technology subsidies successfully induce a change in technology adoption, irrigators may 
adjust to the new technology in a way that offsets the effects of the improvement.  Most 
irrigation efficiency improvements conserve water by reducing the amount of applied water that 
is lost through evaporation, runoff or infiltration.  Irrigators may keep application rates the same 
and allow crop uptake of water to increase (increasing consumptive use) or may apply more 
water (Ward and Pulido-Velazquez, 2008; Huffaker, 2008).  Irrigators may also switch to more 
water intensive crops or expand irrigated acreage (Huffaker and Whittlesey, 2003; Scheierling et 
al., 2006; Pfeiffer and Lin, 2010.).  
 
Research also suggests that not all farmers will respond in the same way to cost-sharing 
programs or to changes in technology. Potential water savings may depend on the types of 
technology a farm operator switches from and to, with the largest potential for conservation 
realized when switching from flood to subsurface drip systems (Peterson and Ding, 2005). But 
this study was limited to groundwater-irrigated corn farms in the High Plains, and the results 
may not apply to surface-water systems or other regions. Further, even models that predict 
increased water use note circumstances when cost-share programs for irrigation technology can 
improve water conservation (Huffaker and Whittlesey, 2003; Huffaker, 2008).  
 
Background on EQIP 3 
 
 
EQIP is the primary Federal conservation program aimed at working agricultural land. Created in 
the 1996 Farm Act to succeed several smaller working-lands conservation programs, EQIP has 
been reauthorized and expanded in the 2002 and 2008 Farm Acts.
3 EQIP works by distributing 
funds to States and U.S. territories, which then enter into contracts with farm operators to 
provide payments for developing conservation plans and then engaging in conservation farm 
management practices or installing conservation structures or equipment.  The Natural Resources 
Conservation Service (NRCS), the agency responsible for administering EQIP, has developed 
guidelines for over 280 different conservation practices (and categories of equipment) that are 
eligible for inclusion in conservation plans. 
 
The Farm Act specifies five national conservation priorities to be addressed by EQIP, and by law 
EQIP is required to devote 60% of funding for conservation issues related to livestock 
operations.  One of the five national priorities that Congress established for EQIP is the 
conservation of ground and surface water resources (NRCS, 2009). To address this national 
priority, EQIP funds investments in equipment that can improve irrigation efficiency, structures 
and land leveling that can reduce water loss and runoff, and management practices to more 
precisely control the timing and rate of water application on irrigated fields.  
 
EQIP is designed to reduce water use and conserve ground and surface water supplies. Program 
rules require that EQIP participants who receive payments for water conservation purposes 
actually reduce water use on the farm, rather than simply increasing efficiency and using the 
water savings elsewhere on the farm.
4 It is not clear to what extent this provision is monitored at 
state and local levels, or whether participation in EQIP among irrigated farms prompts farm-level 
changes along the intensive or extensive margin (e.g., by planting more water-intensive crops or 
expanding irrigated acreage).  
 
Funding for irrigation practices is distributed throughout the country. Figure 1 shows county-
level data on the number of water-conservation related contracts (as a share of total farms in a 
county) that were funded between 2005 and 2008.
5  Only counties with at least ten percent of 
harvested acreage under irrigation are included and only cropland areas are shown for those 
counties.  The range in values illustrates significant regional differences in how water-
conservation related EQIP funding is targeted. 
 
Funding for Irrigation in EQIP 
 
Until the 2002 Farm Act, total annual spending in EQIP averaged about $200 million per year. 
The 2002 Farm Act dramatically increased authorized funding for EQIP, with annual spending 
increasing to nearly $1 billion in the program by fiscal year 2007. The 2008 Farm Act expanded 
EQIP further, with authorized spending increased in the legislation to about $1.4 billion per year 
from 2008 to 2012. (Actual spending on EQIP during fiscal years 2008-2010 averaged about 
$1.1 billion per year.) 
                                                           
3 2002 Farm Bill: U.S. Public Law 107-171, May 13, 2002. 2008 Farm Bill: U.S. Public law 110-246, June 18, 
2008.  
4 See section 7 Code of Federal Regulations part 1466.9. Available at: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/cfr/index.html.  
5 Source: ERS calculations of USDA, Natural Resources Conservation Service data. 4 
 
  
To determine whether or not the expansion in EQIP also meant an expansion in funding for 
equipment and practices related to irrigated agriculture, we identified 32 practices that are 
potentially water-conservation related.  Figure 2 shows the change in water-conservation related 
funding over time and the large increase in funding following the 2002 Farm Bill. Investments in 
irrigation equipment, such as sprinklers and micro-irrigation equipment, and water conveyance 
systems, such as pipelines, are the most significant components of EQIP funding for irrigation-
related practices.  These practices, which are capital intensive, also benefitted from a change in 
the 2002 Farm Act that increased the maximum size of EQIP contracts.  
 
Federal funding for irrigation equipment has occurred amid a general trend of irrigation 
investments as irrigated farms switch to more water-efficient irrigation systems, and as irrigated 
acreage and water use expand in some regions. Estimates from the Farm and Ranchland 
Irrigation Survey, administered by the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, indicate 
that expenditures on irrigation equipment and machinery were about $816 million in 2003 and 




In this paper we use the treatment effects framework to evaluate the EQIP program.  In this 
section we discuss our specification for EQIP participation, the use of differencing to control for 
unobserved farm-specific, time-constant variables, and controls for any remaining bias due to 




On the simplest level, irrigators either participate in EQIP or they do not.  In evaluating the 
effectiveness of EQIP, modeling participation as a binary treatment is a useful approach.  It 
allows us to examine the average treatment effect for the treated, the change in outcome for the 
average farm that has participated in the program.  In this way, we examine the effectiveness of 
the national program while implicitly conditioning on the average suite of practices that farmers 
have voluntarily selected.  Due to this approach, our findings are only applicable to this 
particular program over this particular time period.   
 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated, Controlling for Unobservables 
 
Let the following model represent an outcome for an irrigated farm (i) at time (t) conditional on a 
farm-level fixed effect (a(i)), a time trend, and an indicator of EQIP participation.  
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The outcome for the farm is differenced to remove the farm-level fixed effect.  The remaining error is 
composed of a regional outcome shock (m(j) and an idiosyncratic farm-level shock (u(i)). 
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For this model to be consistently estimated in this form, the critical identification assumption is 
that the farm’s participation decision is exogenous with respect to the farm’s idiosyncratic shock.  
Our estimation primarily relies upon the large increase in funding after 2003 to ensure this 
identification.  Farms were simply not able to participate to the same extent prior to this period, 
particularly for capital-intensive conservation projects such as irrigation efficiency 
improvements. 
 
Identifying a Causal Effect when Participation is Endogenous 
 
The identification assumption may not hold because participation is voluntary and contracts are 
not randomly assigned. Even after the increase in EQIP funding that followed the 2002, more 
than 85% of investment in irrigation technology is funded directly by farmers.  Farms that did 
participate in EQIP may have made the irrigation investments in absence of program funding, 
and it’s possible that irrigation outcomes (such as technology choices or acreage expansion) are 
driving the decision to participate in EQIP. We explore two alternative specifications to control 
for the endogeneity this would induce. 
 
An instrumental variables model uses a set of variables that are excluded from the regression but 
are able to predict the probability that a farm participates in EQIP.  As a two-stage-least-squares 
estimator, this implicitly uses a linear probability model to predict participation.  The exclusion 
restrictions are assumed to hold for several variables: EQIP participation in the previous period, 
a proxy for EQIP competitiveness that takes into account the number of farms in a given county 
and the number of EQIP contracts that go toward addressing other conservation concerns, and 
the sources of information a farm relies on to learn about conservation program improvements.  
 
Matching methods present an alternative approach based on an assumption that observations can 
be matched based on observation covariates to a sufficient extent so that the treatment is 
“ignorable” in the sense that, conditional on the matching, the treatment is independent of the 
potential outcomes for a treated farms (Heckman et al. 1997, Abadie 2005, Heckman and Vylacil 
2007).  Ideal matching covariates are those variables that impact both the outcome and the 
likelihood of treatment but are not themselves influenced by the treatment.  Given the desire to 
ensure that the treatment group is match to controls with similar climate and water resources, we 
use a nearest-neighbor matching method and incorporate latitude and longitude among the 
matching covariates.  We also include a number of variables taken from the first year in each 




Panel data provides a means to control for unobserved producer heterogeneity that is central to 
irrigation technology demand and a significant endogeneity concern for cross-sectional studies 
on irrigation. Unfortunately, true panel data on irrigators is exceedingly rare (e.g.: Schoengold et 
al., 2006).  A few studies have created cross-sectional, time series data sets by pooling multiple 
years of USDA’s Farm and Ranch Irrigation Survey (FRIS) (Moore et al. 1994, Mullen et al. 
2009).  To our knowledge, this paper is the first study to construct a true panel dataset by linking 
farm-level observations across years. 6 
 
 
The FRIS is conducted every five years following the U.S. Census of Agriculture, and collects 
information from irrigators on water application, expenditures on irrigation equipment, acreage 
irrigated and technologies used, water sources, and other farm-level data.  The three most recent 
surveys were conducted in 1998, 2003, and 2008.  The population of irrigated farms is identified 
using the previous year’s Census responses, and a stratified sample of farms is selected in each 
state.  
 
The final FRIS sample totals about 10% of all irrigated farms in the United States. Due to the 
highly skewed distribution of farm sizes, larger farms are sampled with a higher probability than 
other farms to ensure that they are adequately represented in the sample.  (The largest irrigators 
are in a “certainty stratum” and are sampled with a probability of one.)  This sampling design 
provides a significant advantage for constructing panels across multiple survey years.  As shown 
in the summary statistics table, the 2003/2008 panel has about 4,000 observations and the 
1998/2008 panel has about 2,000 observations.  While the stratified sampling makes these larger 
sample sizes possible, it also makes inference about national-level program effects more 
difficult.  To preserve the ability to make inference about EQIP’s impacts at the population level, 




Summary statistics are presented in table 2, which is organized by type of variable (treatment, 
outcome, or covariate) and by panel. 
 
FRIS allows us to identify each respondent’s EQIP participation history. The survey asks 
respondents if they currently or have in the last five years participated in any government 
payment or technical assistance program. If yes, the respondent indicates whether they 
participated in EQIP or other programs. These responses are used to identify the treated group of 
the sample, i.e., those who participate in EQIP.  The binary nature of this question corresponds to 
the binary specification of program participation in the empirical model.  As indicated in the first 
row of table 2, about 9.5 percent of 2008 irrigators participated in EQIP between 2004 and 2008.  
About 4.9 percent of 2008 irrigators participated between 1999 and 2003.  Only 2.1 percent 
participated in both periods.  (In the 1998/2008 panel, the participation rate is about 8.2 percent 
in the initial period of 1996-1998.  The rate of participation in both periods remains low at 2.7 
percent.) 
 
FRIS also collects a great deal of data on outcome variables.  We use seven different outcome 
variables to measure rates of technology adoption, water use, water application rates, and land 
use. 
 
For technology adoption, we use two different variables.  The variable improveYEAR is a binary 
variable that equal 1 if a farm indicated having made a capital or technical improvement over the 
                                                           
6 NASS sampling weights are the inverse of the probability that a farm is selected.  Since the surveys are 
independent draws, the probability that a 2008 irrigator was selected in both 2008 and 2003 (for example) is the 
product of the inverse of the farm’s 2008 weight and the inverse of the farm’s 2003 weight.  Therefore, since smaller 
farms are much less likely to be captured in the panel dataset, they receive more weight in light of their lower 
probability of selection. 7 
 
past five years for the expressed purpose of conserving water and/or reducing energy use.  About 
39.1 percent of irrigators made a water- or energy-conserving investment between 2004 and 
2008, roughly four times as many as participated in EQIP.  The variable shr_cons_YEAR is the 
share of acres that are in a potentially water conserving technology (of the type typically funded 
by EQIP).  This variable is constructed from the data collected on acres irrigated by different 
technologies and relies on the definitions used in Schaible et al. (2009).  The average farm’s 
share of acreage in conserving technologies is 36.3 percent in 2008, only minimally higher that 
the average of 35.7 percent in 2003.  (For the 1998/2008 panel, this share actually went down 
between periods.) 
 
For water use, the variable acreft_YEAR measures the total amount of water used on irrigated 
acreage by taking the sum of the water used across all crops and pasture.  The average water use 
per farm is 611.3 acre-feet in 2008 and 536.8 acre-feet in 2003.  There is an alternative way of 
constructing total water use from FRIS, namely by summing total water used across water 
sources, which we do not use in this paper. 
 
For water application rates, we use two different variables.  The primary measure, 
avg_app_YEAR, is the acre-weighted average of the application rate for each crop harvested by a 
farm, including pasture.  The average application rate was 1.875 acre-feet per acre in 2008 and 
1.191 acre-feet per acre in 2003.  (In the 1998/2008 panel, the average application rate was 1.302 
acre-feet per acre in 2008 and 1.563 acre-feet per acre in 1998.)  The sensitivity in these averages 
to the sample is highly suggestive of the need for panel data methods.  The secondary measure is 
an effort to control for double cropping, it divides the sum of water use across all crops 
(excluding pasture) by the total harvested acreage.  In almost all cases this alternative application 
rate has a higher average than its counterpart; the one exception is the 2003 application rates. 
 
For land use, the variable ac_irr_YEAR captures the total number of acres irrigated in a survey 
year, and the variable shr_irr_YEAR captures the share of operated acres that are irrigated. 
 
Covariates used include a number of variables constructed directly from FRIS: the average 
marginal price of water, per acre maintenance cost, per acre labor costs, share of acres irrigated 
using groundwater as a source, a set of dummy variables for the sources of information used to 
obtain information about water conservation practices, and a set of dummy variables for sources 
of off-farm water.
7  In addition, we use each observation’s county to incorporate the following 
county-level variables: latitude, longitude, July Palmer drought index in each survey year, share 
of harvested acreage in a county that is irrigated, crop reporting district identifiers, and a proxy 
for EQIP competitiveness, which we describe in more detail below. 
 
Description of Protracts data 
                                                           
7 The average marginal price of water paid by a farm is the sum of the average price per acre-foot paid for any off 
farm water and the average per-acre pumping costs.  Per-acre pumping cost is the sum of all pumping costs (across 
different energy sources) divided by the total amount of water applied.  While this could potentially understate the 
marginal cost for farms that use both pumped and unpumped water, assuming that only qroundwater is pumped 
leads to unrealistically high marginal cost estimates.  Scarcity rent for groundwater is not included directly in the 
estimate of the marginal price of water, but both depth to groundwater and a set of dummy variables indicating 
whether the aquifer is declining or rising are used in the analysis. 8 
 
In addition to farm-level data drawn from FRIS, we construct a measure of county-level 
competition for EQIP contracts. The competition measure is used as an instrument to predict 
which irrigated farms have a high probability of participating in EQIP, but which is plausibly 
unrelated to irrigation outcomes at the farm level. 
 
County-level competition for EQIP contracts is drawn from administrative data. State and local 
jurisdictions enter individual EQIP contract information into the Protracts database, maintained 
by the USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service. Protracts provides a detailed description 
of conservation practices adopted through EQIP and payments that operators receive for each 
practice. Each contract can be located within a county where the contract was initiated. However, 
detailed information about farms and operators is not available to link contracts directly with 
other data sets (such as FRIS). 
 
Each contract in the database is classified based on whether it includes any water-conserving 
practices. The competition measure is defined as the ratio of the total number of these contracts 
during fiscal years 2005-2008 to the total number of farms in the county (from the 2007 Census 
of Agriculture). The analysis is restricted to counties where at least 10% of the cropland is 
irrigated. 
 
Table A1 describes the practices funded in EQIP that could be used for irrigation water 
conservation. Practices are further distinguished by whether they likely can be used only for 
irrigation-related water conservation, or if they may be used to address multiple environmental 
concerns in addition to water conservation. For a contract to be included in the numerator of the 
competition ratio, it must include one of the practices from the top panel of table A1.
8 Figure 1 





Table 3 presents the results of the analysis.  Values in the table present the estimated of EQIP 
participation between 2004 and 2008 on the outcome variables.  Each row represents a different 
outcome variable.  The first seven rows of the table show the results for the 2003/2008 panel, 
which uses first-differencing between 2003 and 2008 to control for unobserved farm-level 
variables.  The bottom seven rows of the table show the results for the 1998/2008 panel, which 
uses first-differencing between 1998 and 2008 to control for unobserved farm-level variables. 
 
Each column represents a different model.  Each model makes different assumptions about how 
to appropriately define the control group of farms that did not participate in EQIP.   
 
The first model (DnD-1) is a difference-in-differences model that does not control for other time-
varying covariates (weather and price) or for region-specific shocks.  For this model, all non-
                                                           
8 Identifying practices with multiple conservation uses is more important when measuring competition in EQIP 
participation by a dollar-based ratio (e.g., the ratio of EQIP payments for irrigation-related water conservation to 
total EQIP funding in the county). In that case, spending on multiple-use practices would be included if the contract 
also contained practices from the top panel of table A1; i.e., the multiple-use practices would be judged to be part of 
a conserving irrigation project. 9 
 
participating farms are assumed to be the appropriate control group.  In general, the effects of 
this model cannot be taken as the causal effects of EQIP participation.  This model is presented 
to provide an indication of the extent of the selection bias. 
 
The second model (DnD-2) adds time-varying covariates and crop-reporting district dummy 
variables to the first model.  For the second model, the control group for EQIP participators 
includes farms within the same crop reporting district with similar changes in drought indicies 
and marginal water prices.  As expected, the effects are smaller for all of the outcome variables.  
The main explanation for this is geographic variation in EQIP funding.  Regions that are 
experiencing greater water scarcity are more likely to have investments in water-conserving 
technology and more likely to have average reductions in water application rates, which would 
bias the previous model away from zero in its estimates of the effects of EQIP participation. 
 
The DnD-2 model suggests that in terms of technology adoption, irrigators participating in EQIP 
were more likely to adopt a water or energy saving technology and had a larger average change 
in the share of potentially water-conserving technologies.  This holds true for both the 2003 and 
the 2008 panels.  However, relative to all other farms in both panels, irrigators participating in 
EQIP increased their water use, increased their irrigated acreage, and increased the share of 
operated acres that are irrigated.  In terms of application rates, farms participating in EQIP had 
relative declines in application rates (by either measure).  In summary, the DnD-2 model 
suggests that EQIP may lead to technology changes and reductions in application rates, but 
actually leads to an increase in water use by facilitating an expansion of irrigated acreage. 
 
As noted in the empirical methodology section, the DnD-2 model may suffer from biased 
estimates of the effect of EQIP participation.  For most of our outcome variables, subsequent 
analysis suggests that this is likely to be the case.  Application rates provide a useful example. 
 
In evaluation of job training programs, difference in marginal effects based this difference in 
baseline conditions has become known as “Ashenfelter’s dip.”  With respect to flow-rates, a 
similar bias could occur if farm’s participating in EQIP tended to have above average application 
rates in the baseline periods.  To test the DnD-2 model for potential bias due to this effect, the 
fifth column of the table (DnD-2 check) shows the results of regressing the baseline level of each 
outcome variable (in either 2003 or 1998) on the regional dummies and the differenced drought 
indicies and marginal prices.  In most cases, this check reveals a statistically significant 
difference in baseline conditions between the treatment and control groups.  For the 2003/2008 
panel, the DnD-2 model suggests that EQIP participation lowered water application rates by 
0.222 acre-feet acre, but the test of Ashenfelter’s dip reveals that these participators also began in 
2003 with an average application rate that was 0.241 acre-feet per acre higher than the control 
groups. 
 
The other results in the fifth column indicate other, perhaps unexpected, systematic difference 
between the treatment and control groups in the DnD-2 model.  Farms participating in EQIP 
tended to be more likely have higher levels of potentially conserving technologies in the baseline 
period.  Farms participating in EQIP also tended to use more water in the baseline, the opposite 
of what we would expect in terms of “Ashenfelter’s dip.”  For the 1998/2008 panel, farms that 10 
 
participated in EQIP also tended to have more irrigated acreage in the baseline period.  This 
could be a case of large farms getting larger and also being more likely to participate in EQIP. 
 
The third model (NN) is the nearest neighbor matching estimator and is shown in the third 
column of the table.  In all but one case, the estimated marginal effect of EQIP participation is 
not statistically different from zero.  One reason for this is that the point estimates of the effects 
are generally smaller, as expected based on the Ashenfelter dip tests.  Another reason is the loss 
of efficiency due to the effort to control for bias. 
 
If we interpret the statistically insignificant coefficients in the matching estimators as true zeros, 
then our analysis indicates that EQIP participation has not had a significant effect on technology 
adoption, water application rates, or overall water use.  This result suggests that irrigators self-
select into the program and rely on the program to pay for irrigation improvements that they 
would be likely to make anyway.  If we were to accept the bias of the DnD-2 model in exchange 
for the efficient improvements, we would still conclude that EQIP does not reduce water use at 
the farm level. 
 
The fourth model (IV) is presented in the fourth column of the table.  The IV model generally 
suffers from weak instruments, as evidenced by the large changes in coefficient estimates, some 




The dramatic increase in EQIP funding following the 2002 Farm Act provided an opportunity to 
evaluate the impact of EQIP on irrigation efficiency and water conservation.  Using a unique 
farm-level panel dataset that spans this increase in funding, we are able to compare the changes 
in several different outcomes between farms that participated in EQIP and appropriately defined 
control groups.  Based on a nearest-neighbor matching estimator, we find no evidence that EQIP 
has resulted in any measurable water conservation at the farm-level. 
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Figure 1: Location of and competition for EQIP funding 12 
 
Source: Acreage of cropland irrigated and number of farms per county obtained from USDA 
Agricultural Census.  Number of water-related contracts per county obtained from authors’ 
analysis of USDA PROTRACTS database.   13 
 
Figure 2: Time-line for EQIP data 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of USDA PROTRACTS database.   14 
 













1979  50,154,249  93,071,345  1.856 
  1984  45,821,428  82,182,177  1.794  -3.4% 
1988  47,753,727  84,182,177  1.763  -5.0% 
1993  46,418,380  79,627,392  1.715  -7.6% 
1998  50,028,439  90,563,665  1.810  -2.4% 
2003  52,492,687  86,757,665  1.653  -10.9% 
2008  54,929,915  91,235,036  1.661  -10.5% 
 
Source: USDA Agricultural Census, FRIS: 2008, table 11; 1998, table 10; 1994, table 10; 1983, table 10. 
   15 
 
Table 2: Selected summary statistics 
 
2003/2008 Panel 
Variable  Description  Median  Mean  Std. dev.  N 
   PARTICIPATION VARIABLES  
        eqip2008  Participated '04-'08 
 
0.095  0.294  3,781 
eqip2003  Participated '99-'03 
 
0.049  0.215  3,781 
eqip0308  Participated both 
 
0.021  0.142  3,781 
   OUTCOME VARIABLES 
        improve2008  Improved '04-'08 
 
0.391  0.488  3,781 
shr_con_2008  Share conserving '08  0.000  36.366  45.472  3,781 
shr_con_2003  Share conserving '03  0.000  35.727  44.524  3,781 
acreft_2008  Water use '08  56.000  611.301  2718.683  3,781 
acreft_2003  Water use '03  24.200  536.828  2202.950  3,781 
avg_app_2008  Application rate '08  1.400  1.875  1.719  3,780 
avg_app_2003  Application rate '03  1.100  1.191  0.816  3,717 
alt_app_2008  Alternative rate '08  1.400  1.937  1.764  3,747 
alt_app_2003  Alternative rate '03  1.100  1.164  0.802  3,743 
ac_irr_2008  Acres irrigated '08  62.000  413.143  1016.387  3,781 
ac_irr_2003  Acres irrigated '03  63.000  369.999  1020.962  3,781 
shr_irr_2008  Share irrigated '08  58.333  50.552  28.291  3,781 
shr_irr_2003  Share irrigated '03  61.111  49.134  28.816  3,781 
   INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
        waterprice2008  Water price '08  9.259  36.205  100.074  3,781 
waterpr~2003  Water price '03  5.068  102.882  1664.070  3,781 
rising2008  Rising aquifer '08 
 
0.344  0.475  2,860 
rising2003  Rising aquifer '03 
 
0.073  0.261  2,794 
decline_2008  Declining aquifer '08 
 
0.104  0.305  2,860 
decline_2003  Declining aquifer '03 
 
0.382  0.486  2,794 
shr_gw_2008  Share groundwater '08  30.120  47.423  48.316  3,781 
shr_off_2008  Share off-farm '08  0.000  21.226  40.546  1,748 
info_ea_2003  Extension agent (0/1) 
 
0.231  0.422  3,781 
info_cn_2003  Consultant (0/1) 
 
0.203  0.402  3,781 
info_gt_2003  Government (0/1) 
 
0.105  0.306  3,781 
avgdepth2008  Depth to water '08  105.000  123.516  101.527  2,860 
avgdepth2003  Depth to water '03  87.500  93.495  78.118  2,794 
scarcity2008  Scarce water (0/1) 
 
0.025  0.155  3,781 
julyPDSI2008  Drought index '08  1.940  0.809  2.462  3,747 
julyPDSI2003  Drought index '03  1.320  0.410  2.248  3,747 
shr_w_con  Water contracts/farm  0.065  0.090  0.076  3,745 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
1998/2008 Panel 
Variable  Description  Median  Mean  Std. dev.  N 
   PARTICIPATION VARIABLES  
        eqip2008   Participated '04-'08 
 
0.099  0.298  2,076 
eqip1998  Participated '99-'03 
 
0.082  0.275  2,076 
eqip9808   Participated both 
 
0.027  0.163  2,076 
   OUTCOME VARIABLES 
        improve2008  Improved '04-'08  1.000  0.655  0.475  2,076 
shr_con_2008  Share conserving '08  0.000  25.158  39.945  2,076 
shr_con_1998  Share conserving '03  27.273  39.127  35.622  2,076 
acreft_2008  Water use '08  102.000  637.496  2514.618  2,076 
acreft_1998  Water use '03  305.250  606.311  1548.363  2,076 
avg_app_2008  Application rate '08  0.853  1.302  1.058  2,076 
avg_app_1998  Application rate '03  0.974  1.563  1.251  2,046 
alt_cro~2008  Alternative rate '08  0.950  1.348  1.120  2,064 
alt_cro~1998  Alternative rate '03  1.000  1.578  1.260  2,068 
ac_irr_2008  Acres irrigated '08  196.000  410.865  972.968  2,076 
ac_irr_1998  Acres irrigated '03  407.000  438.812  715.111  2,076 
shr_irr_2008  Share irrigated '08  61.250  55.482  27.863  2,076 
shr_irr_1998  Share irrigated '03  56.528  59.244  24.331  2,076 
   INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
        waterpr~2008  Water price '08  79.116  99.810  105.052  2,076 
waterpr~1998  Water price '03  13.566  18.545  48.279  2,076 
rising2008  Rising aquifer '08  0.000  0.493  0.500  1,582 
rising1998  Rising aquifer '03  1.000  0.761  0.426  1,568 
declini~2008  Declining aquifer '08  0.000  0.054  0.226  1,582 
declini~1998  Declining aquifer '03  0.000  0.183  0.387  1,568 
shr_gw_2008  Share groundwater '08  100.000  60.710  46.293  2,076 
shr_sw_~2008  Share off-farm '08  100.000  60.071  48.277  972 
info_ea_1998  Extension agent (0/1)  1.000  0.585  0.493  2,076 
info_cn_1998  Consultant (0/1)  0.000  0.216  0.411  2,076 
info_gt_1998  Government (0/1)  0.000  0.335  0.472  2,076 
avgdepth2008  Depth to water '08  45.000  54.492  52.127  1,582 
avgdepth1998  Depth to water '03  28.000  30.561  26.792  1,568 
scarcity2008  Scarce water (0/1)  0.000  0.073  0.260  2,076 
julyPDSI2008  Drought index '08  0.870  1.560  2.999  2,049 
julyPDSI1998  Drought index '03  3.470  3.396  3.036  2,049 
shr_f_w_wa~n  Water contracts/farm  0.034  0.068  0.075  2,048 
   Table 3: Marginal Effects of EQIP Participation 
            2003/2008 Panel  Model 
        OUTCOME  DND-1  DnD-2  NN  IV  DnD-2 Check 
Technology improvement (0/1)    0.2814***   0.2613***    0.1089     0.8274***   0.1416*** 
Share of conserving    3.3612***   0.6647    5.9682    -7.4453   1.9494*** 
Water Use (acre-ft)  205.0744***  80.1353**   24.5318  1014.0318***  82.5347** 
Application rate 
(ac.ft./ac.)   -0.8378***  -0.2227***   -0.0787    -0.5892***   0.2410*** 
Alternative app. rate   -0.7458***  -0.2633***   -0.0417    -0.8693***   0.3636*** 
Acres irrigated  109.6832***  85.7923***  -46.5130   360.2370***  17.9994 
Share of acres irrigated    3.3097***  -1.2544***   -0.2591   -16.4541***  -0.24 
            1998/2008 Panel  Model 
        OUTCOME  DND-1  DnD-2  NN  IV  DnD-2 Check 
Technology improvement (0/1)    0.0114*    0.1957***     0.1020   -0.0339**    0.3069*** 
Share of conserving   37.1074***   18.8031***    17.7322   82.7562***    6.2847*** 
Water Use (acre-ft)  598.5524***  121.8216**  1021.0570  435.9363***  227.1722** 
Application rate 
(ac.ft./ac.)    0.1595***   -0.2844***    -0.0759    1.0725***    0.0223 
Alternative app. rate    0.3600***   -0.2019***    -0.1054    1.0805***   -0.0129 
Acres irrigated  224.8989***  147.3422***   514.0017*  447.4918***  235.1802*** 
Share of acres irrigated    6.7054***   -0.6228     2.9534   16.3844***  -11.5901*** 
 
Model notes:   DnD-1:  First-differences in outcome regressed on EQIP participation dummy variable. 
    DnD-2:  DnD-1 with weather and price differences as well as crop reporting district fixed-effects 
    NN:  Nearest-neighbor matching estimator of average treatment effect for the treated  with three matches.   Matching covariates are latitude, 
longitude, difference in weather and water price, and baseline values for acres operated, acres rented, acres in pasture, application rate, 
share of acres in groundwater, water supplier and EQIP participation. 
IV:  DnD-2 with following exogenous instruments for EQIP participation: EQIP participation in the baseline period, a water scarcity 
indicator, a proxy for competitiveness of EQIP for irrigators in a given county and a set of dummy variables on where a farm gets 
information about water conservation.      
 
Table A1. EQIP practices used to address water conservation issues on irrigated 
farmland 
   
NRCS Practice Code  Practice Name 
a. Irrigation-related practices 
320  Irrigation canal or lateral 
388  Irrigation field ditch 
428A, B, C  Irrigation water conveyance, ditch and canal lining 
430AA, CC, DD, EE, FF  Irrigation water conveyance, pipeline 
436  Irrigation storage reservoir 
441  Microirrigation system 
442  Sprinkler system 
443  Surface and subsurface irrigation system 
447  Tailwater recovery system 
449  Irrigation water management 
464  Land leveling for irrigation 
552A, B  Irrigation pit or regulating reservoir 
   
b. Irrigation-related practices with multiple uses 
348  Dam, diversion 
349  Dam, multiple purpose 
351  Well decommissioning 
355  Well water testing 
362  Diversion 
402  Dam 
431  Multi-outlet pipeline, above ground 
450  Anionic polyacrylamide application 
521  Pond sealing or lining 
533  Pumping plant for water control 
587  Structure for water control 
607  Surface drainage field ditch 
608  Surface drainage main or lateral 
610  Toxic salt reduction 
636  Water harvesting catchment 
640  Water spreading 
642  Water well 
738  Soil salinity control 
740  Pond sealing or lining, soil cement 
743  Improved water application 
   
Note: Detailed practice descriptions are available on the USDA, NRCS website: 
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/technical/Standards/nhcp.html 
 